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TO : AD/RR

3 May 1956

THRU : Chief, D/S *fwb*
Chief, ERA

FROM : Chief, S/COM

SUBJECT: Item of Importance to ORR Discussed in IOTAC 2 May 1956

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1. Attached is a copy of [REDACTED] report on the IOTAC Meeting held on 2 May 1956, which he attended in my place.

2. The problem posed for the Radio Station Branch of the Special Register of OCR emanates directly from NSC Directive 169. The essence of that problem is the so-called "technical" problem involving NSA. This problem is a facet of the broad technical problem which ORR and other offices of CIA has been grappling with for some years. It stands unsolved today.

3. It will be noted from the single available copy of the CIA Inspector General's report, attached to the original of this memorandum, that he is now aware, at least, of the OCR facet of the "technical" problem with NSA. He may be aware of ORR's facets of the broad problem. If not, it seems likely that he may wish to obtain an overall CIA picture of the "technical" problem, including ORR's either by solicitation or invitation.

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4. It will also be noted that [REDACTED] Special Assistant to the AD/SI and CIA ELINT Staff Officer has actively entered negotiations looking toward resolution of the problem. He intends to bring the matter to the personal attention of the DCI, DDI, and the Director of NSA.

5. As you know OCI has recently become active in working toward a broadfront solution of the technical problem. In consequence of a meeting called by OCI recently, in which OSI, ORR, and OCR were represented, S/COM was instructed to prepare a general, continuing requirement against NSA for intelligence information. This requirement has been prepared. It is our understanding that OCI is to call another meeting to decide on strategy and procedures for handling that requirement.

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6. It is not yet clear whether either [REDACTED] and/or the IG intend to handle the RSB facet of the problem first and separately or whether they plan to handle all aspects together and at once. It is not known where OCI fits into the proposed handling of the problem.

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Enclosure:
Copy of [REDACTED]

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copy of CIA Inspector General's Report

cc to Chief, ST/S

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

DATE: 2 May 1956

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: IOTAC Meeting 2 May 1956

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1. The "technical" problem with NSA was discussed during the IOTAC meeting this morning. [REDACTED] CIA Elint Staff Officer, participated in this discussion.

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2. The aspect of the "technical" problem discussed dealt mainly with information required by RSB/SR to accomplish the mission prescribed in NSC-169 and assigned to CIA. Mr. [REDACTED] RSB/SR, told of his difficulties in obtaining information from NSA, emphasizing the time consumed in his negotiations to date.

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3. At this point [REDACTED] asked me how we were doing in ORR with respect to the overall "technical" problem. I stated that we had to negotiate with NSA for each project involving the use of their material. I further indicated that on one recent project over a 100 hours were used by analysts in negotiations without obtaining desired data. I stated that it was our belief that we were not together with NSA on the definition of "technical". I said that we in S/COM were of the opinion that policy making and working level people of both agencies should get together and seek a definition of the word "technical" and a solution to the problem as it now exists.

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4. Earlier in the meeting [REDACTED] indicated his willingness to discuss this problem with the DCI and Director, NSA. He was concerned as to the feasibility of discussing the RSB/SR and ORR problem together. It was decided that the RSB/SR problem should be considered now. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to prepare a brief history of his problem, a set of specific requirements, and a brief discussion establishing the "need-to-know" to be used as a basis for his discussion.

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5. I indicated that you had done considerable work looking toward a constructive solution to this problem and in preparing a recent draft of general, continuing requirements. I told him that your recent rationale on the subject might be helpful in developing a CIA position and approach.

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6. You may be interested in reading the attached Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 May 1956, which sets forth the comments of the CIA Inspector General with regard to his review of NSC-169 and RSB/SR fulfillment of its mission set forth therein. This memorandum was prepared for committee background use only.

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Committee Only

1 May 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The following is an excerpt from the Inspector General's recent survey of the Office of Central Reference:

Review of NSC-169

a. NSC-169 assigns the Agency responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of a central file on foreign radio frequency usage and radio station particulars. This responsibility is discharged by OCR in the Radio Stations Branch of the Special Register located in Barton Hall. The Branch also provides statistical support to OSI's Broadcast Evaluation Program, which is another phase of CIA's responsibilities under NSC-169. The data maintained under the provisions of this program is of inestimable value to the U. S. Government in its participation in international radio conferences and negotiations with other countries in the allocation of international radio frequency channels. In this sense the maintenance of the file is overt. As a by-product, however, accumulation of this data, its processing and recovery by machine systems have an extremely valuable potential to the clandestine operations of this Agency in the allocation of agent frequencies and signal plans in addition to its intelligence application in the general evaluation of foreign radio communications techniques and radio station operations.

b. Although only created during FY 1955, the Special Register has already uncovered and developed many sources of information for the file and has done an efficient job of devising systems of analysis, machine and service operation. During the short period of its operations, it had received 1,500,000 monitoring reports and nearly 3,000 intelligence documents and has analyzed and processed them by machine systems into the files of the Radio Stations Branch. Together with the FCC, FBIS, Commo and commercial carriers, NSA has contributed to this program. Because of its mission and general responsibilities in the communications field, NSA is a primary source of data for this file. However, efforts to get NSA to comply with provisions of NSC-169 have been achieved only after long and tedious negotiations on a working level between Special Register representatives, OCI and their counterparts in NSA. NSA still refuses to provide certain data essential to the activities of the Radio Stations Branch on the grounds that USCIB security regulations will not permit its use outside of special channels. The Special Register has done an excellent job of negotiation for informal exchange of the majority of data needed from NSA but has been blocked at every turn in securing this one remaining category despite Agency assurances regarding sanitization and controlled special dissemination. Since the data desired involves coverage of geographic areas of particular interest, this refusal has seriously limited the Agency in its efforts to comply completely with the provisions of NSC-169.

c. Formal negotiations with NSA have been initiated on at least two separate occasions in an effort to confirm informal agreements reached between Agency and NSA counterpart representatives. These formal requests have been handled via Agency/NSA channels and were initially denied by the Director of NSA. [An additional appeal is now pending. Apparently everyone in NSA but its Director recognizes the validity of the Agency's need for this data.] NSA at the present time is one of the Agency's heaviest consumers of collateral material. Indeed, NSA is now receiving standard distribution of almost every type of intelligence material received by the Agency. In addition, it is the recipient of several gratis services rendered by the Special Register which is now providing NSA with microfilm copies of special intelligence material together with special machine listings of certain categories of material in Agency special intelligence files. [The Agency, through OCR, is providing all of the "quid" to NSA with little "quo".] Since the basis for NSA's refusal to provide complete data to the Agency (OCR) is based on USCIB security regulations, it is believed that the Agency should appeal to the USCIB for a waiver in this instance or if this is not approved, the Director should inform the National Security Council that he cannot comply completely with the provisions of NSC-169 because of USCIB's security restriction on the release of certain NSA data essential to such compliance.

It is, therefore, recommended that:

1. The DCI, as Chairman of the USCIB, present the Agency's current dilemma with regard to reconciliation of the Agency's responsibilities under NSC-169 with USCIB security restrictions on the release of certain classified data to the Agency.
2. If such a waiver cannot be obtained then the DCI should advise the National Security Council of his inability to comply with the provisions of NSC-169 because of a USCIB security limitation on the release of certain data by the NSA.

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